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Abstract The main focus of this essay is to closely engage with the role of sci-
entist-subjectivity in the making of objectivity in Lorraine Daston and Peter
Galison’s book Objectivity, and Daston’s later and earlier works On Scientific
Observation and The Moral Economy of Science. I have posited four challenges to
the neo-Kantian and Foucauldian constructions of the co-implication of psychology
and epistemology presented in these texts. Firstly, following Jacques Lacan’s work,
I have argued that the subject of science constituted by the mode of modern science
suffers from paranoia. It is not the fear of subjectivity interfering with objectivity
but the impossibility of knowing the truth of the real that causes paranoia. Here, I
have argued that it is not the ethos of objectivity that drives epistemology as Daston
and Galison suggest, but the pathos of paranoia. The second challenge builds upon
Kant’s own denial that the perfect correspondence between the human will and the
moral law is possible. Kant himself thought that an ethical human act is impossible
without the component of ‘‘pathology.’’ This questions Daston and Galison’s
argument that there is always ethical imperative at the core of epistemic virtue. The
third challenge contests the way Daston and Galison take appearance for being in
their application of the Foucauldian concept of technologies of the self in modeling
the master scientist-self. The fourth challenge questions the notion of the psycho-
logical and unconscious in the making of epistemology in Daston’s later and earlier
work. Against this background, I aim to make a claim that understanding and
disclosing ‘‘entities’’ in the scientific domain presupposes an understanding of
‘‘being’’ in general. My goal is to open up the discussion for an alternative con-
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My parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, my brothers and sisters, and all
my family, and those close to me, people who are my friends, those intimately
near to me, as well as my comrades and my acquaintances, together with all
those more distant people who, during these last years, have been around me,
that is to say army people, employees, my financial and worldly relations,
have most often deceived, insulted, scorned, railed, mocked, mumbled,
dishonoured, brutalised, thrashed me….1
These were the words of the well-known mathematician Georg Cantor who often
suffered psychotic episodes and was hospitalized many times during the develop-
ment of his revolutionary set theories – now known as Cantorian set theories
foundationally important in mathematics and science (Burgoyne 2002: 237).
Psychoanalyst Imre Hermann, who studied the creative work of Cantor, argued
that this was actually an example of parallelism between the psychic structure of
Cantor’s manic-depressive episodes and the structure of his set theory.2 If one closely
looks at the structure of the statement, there are two types of entities here – the people
and Cantor’s perception of what these people are doing to him. Cantor’s relationship
with the first entity becomes distant as the list progresses – begins with parents and
ends with the general worldly relations. But in the list of the second entity, Cantor’s
perception of these people’s actions become more and more physically intense;
beginning with being deceived, Cantor feels brutalized and thrashed as the list
progresses – the stranger the person the more brutalizing the impact. This is the core
of the set theory in mathematics: how the entities in one set relate to the entities in the
other, especially when both sets encompass the infinity of members.
‘‘What are the psychic pre-requisites for the advance of science? How the
analysis of the soul is structured vis-a`-vis the analysis of science?’’ These were the
questions Freud was grappling with in his last work Moses and Monotheism
published in 1938. The same question is asked differently in recent times. ‘‘Is
Science emotional?’’ asks White (2009). Such a question about science might even
mean a heresy. The view that science, supposed to be objective, depends in essential
ways upon highly specific constellations of emotional and existential – subjective –
experiences is fundamentally paradoxical. In fact, subjectivity and objectivity are
commonly arrayed in opposition. More than often, objectivity is a denial, willful
control, or erasure of subjectivity. Steven Shapin calls it a dustbin conception of
subjectivity – the bin collects those stories that deflate, disrupt or disorder
objectivity (Shapin 2012: 171–172). Not only that subjectivity disrupts objectivity,
but the role of individual scientists’ subjectivity in the making of science is often
obliterated, treated as merely incidental, designated as mind reading, or relegated to
1 As quoted in Burgoyne (2002: 237).
2 Hermann similarly proposed parallels between mathematical and psychic structures in the work of
Bertrand Russell (Burgoyne 2002, endnote 25, p. 255).
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biographies. Even when subjectivity is accounted as co-implicated with objectivity,
it is treated only as mental states of collectives. Lorraine Daston discusses the way
certain methodological paradigms such as empiricism and objectivity require moral
economies of affect-saturated values that define mental states of collectives (Daston
1995, 2008). In their historical analysis of the co-production of subjectivity-
objectivity, Daston and Galison insist that they were concerned with the collectives
and not with the individual psychology (Daston and Galison 2007). Steven Shapin
also warns against the risk of ‘‘atomising particularlism’’ and suggests that the
individual reflexes should be disciplined by sociologists’ collectivism (Shapin 1992:
354–355). And when the scientist’s subjectivity is indeed treated in individual
capacity, it is predominantly constructed as the neo-Kantian ideal – a unified and
wilful, self-determined, self-regulated, active and autonomous, rational subject
wilfully driven by social and scientific ethos. Another approach popular among
historians is the scientist-subject as a Foucauldian construct, who is reduced to the
effects of power. Cantor is the kind of example that historians of science are more
likely to treat as a genius scientist gone mad with whom they would be wary of
engaging outside the biographical pages. Taking the example of Cantor, I wish to
modify White’s question ‘‘Is science emotional?’’ into ‘‘Who is the scientist-subject
doing science?’’ In fact, this question is being increasingly engaged with in the
recent works in history of science.3 And still, it would be hard to find the ‘‘mad
excess’’ of Cantor, especially his delirium and his suffering, treated as not just
integral but indispensable part of his science.
The purpose of this essay is to closely engage with the work of Lorraine Daston
and her co-authored work with Peter Galison on the history of scientist-subjectivity
in the making of objective science. The essay mainly engages with Daston and
Galison’s book Objectivity (Daston and Galison 2007) while it also discusses
Daston’s later work On Scientific Observation, and her earlier essay The Moral
Economy of Science (Daston 1995, 2008). The main purpose of this essay is to posit
four challenges to the neo-Kantian and Foucauldian constructions of the co-
implication of psychology and epistemology presented in these texts. Challenging
Daston and Galison’s argument of the co-construction of psychology/subjectivity
and epistemology/objectivity, I want to propose that understanding and disclosing
‘‘entities’’ in scientific domain presupposes an understanding of ‘‘being’’ in general.
By critiquing the neo-Kantian scientist-self I wish to make a case for an alternative
conception of the scientist-subject and accordingly an affective and existential
3 Finding out how we live as we do now Steven Shapin explores the relationship between the authority of
knowledge and the character of knowers (Shapin 1988, 1991, 2007). More so, the co-dependence of the
cognitive and the emotional is also approached by the growing field of existentially oriented scientific
biographies. Here, science is projected as existential choice made by scientists (Nye 2006). See also
(Soderqvist 1996: 69). Lastly, the oldest of the inquiries on science and the self is made by the feminists.
Do women scientists practice science differently than men? Would science be less reductionist, more
empathic and intuitive if women had an equal role in shaping it? For a long time, feminist epistemologies
have been engaged with theorizing the relationship between objectivity and subjectivity, in which the idea
of what can be counted as objective science and who is the knowing subject have been revised from their
positivist and foundationalist predecessors. See, for example, Harding (1986, 1987, 1994, 1996). Also see
Longino (1993, 2001). For a detailed discussion on feminist epistemologies and their construction of the
scientist-subject, see Shah (2013).
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conception of science. I wish to claim, following Michael Polanyi (following
Sartre), that existence precedes essence, or in other words, psychology precedes
epistemology.
The Scientist-Self in Objectivity
In their book Objectivity, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison discuss a rich array of
scientific atlases as records of the co-construction of objectivity-subjectivity.
Scientific atlas is a compendium or a catalogue of visual and other images. The
authors show how the atlas standardized and recorded ideal practices of both
selfhood and objective science. They discuss three different forms of epistemolog-
ical practices – truth-to-nature, mechanical objectivity, and trained judgment in the
making of science represented by these atlases. These epistemological virtues and
the corresponding notions of subjectivity, although chronologically unfolded in
succession since the 18th to 20th centuries, were not mutually exclusive. Each
successive stage built upon as well as reacted to the earlier ones. The main argument
of the book is anchored on mechanical objectivity of the mid-19th to early 20th
century. Scientists in these atlases are portrayed as self-disciplined, steel-willed,
even self-denying individuals, who are motivated by a strong moral drive. The core
task of the scientist-self in the second half of the 19th century was to diminish by
strength of will the subjective in the making of the objective. This would mean
expelling all forms of prejudice, even skill, fantasy, emotional attachment, and
judgment in order to make the cognitive and the perceptual not only ‘‘verifiable,
epistemologically warranted and communicable’’ but also the ‘‘exact’’ and hence the
‘‘objective’’ replica of nature. The scientist-self corresponding to truth-to-nature
objectivity was a sage whereas the one responded to mechanical objectivity was the
indefatigable worker, and the one who practiced trained judgment as objectivity was
intuitive expert (Daston and Galison 2007: 3–7).
The central claim of Daston and Galison’s Objectivity therefore is not only to
show that objectivity has history and hence it is variable, but more importantly to
demonstrate how objectivity – or, in other words, epistemology – is always inter-
articulated with ethos and forms of subjectivity. What is important to note here is
that the virtue of mechanical objectivity is asserted only by the suppression or
expulsion of subjective forces, which is achieved by exercising extreme efforts of
will – this willfulness forms the core of the objective scientist-self. In fact, Daston
and Galison compare the willfulness with asceticism. They claim that ‘‘objectivity is
to epistemology what extreme asceticism is to morality’’(Daston and Galison 2007:
374). They further clarify that the demands of objectivity compel the knower to
develop the most strenuous forms of self-cultivation, which even borders on the
brink of self-denial and self-destruction (Daston and Galison 2007: 40). Daston and
Galison thus insist on a strong link between epistemology and ethics; they argue that
in pursuit of objectivity scientists convert themselves to another style of life like
ascetics or religious philosophers of the antiquity. In short, in making a case that the
changes in subjectivity are co-implicated with the changes in objectivity, Daston
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and Galison construct the scientific-self as a neo-Kantian ideal – a determinate,
regulated, active, and autonomous subject driven by willful ascetic ethos.
This willful self, however, is acknowledged to constitute fear. In her article On
Scientific Observation, which followed the publication of Objectivity, Daston argues
that the fear that the subjective lenses might filter or distort objective empirical
results have always remained in the background (Daston 2008: 97–98). Fear as
constitutive of the scientist-self has a much stronger place in the book Objectivity.
‘‘In all cases, it is fear that drives epistemology,’’ write Daston and Galison (Daston
and Galison 2007: 49). All epistemology begins in fear – the fear that ‘‘the world is
too complex or the human intellect is too weak to grasp this complexity’’ (Daston
and Galison 2007: 49). Objectivity is one such chapter in this history of intellectual
fear. Daston and Galison, however, contend that the fear objectivity addresses is
different from and deeper than the others. The threat to objectivity is not external, it
is rather internal – ‘‘Objectivity fears subjectivity, the core self’’ (Daston and
Galison 2007: 372–374).
As one reviewer argues, if the fear, not ethos but pathos drive epistemology, then
causality is introduced between psychology and epistemology – in the sense that
psychology/subjectivity and epistemology/objectivity are no longer co-constructed
but psychology precedes by driving epistemology (Anderson 2008: 660–661). A
number of reviewers raised similar issues with the book Objectivity. For example,
one reviewer asked: ‘‘Is Objectivity an emanation of more fundamental subjectivity,
a subjectivity that is afraid of error, of the inaccuracies that ensue from any act of
willfulness, afraid ultimately of itself?’’ (Switzer 2009: 100–101). Paul White called
it an outbreak of ‘‘epistemic fear’’ on the pages of Victorian Studies (the journal in
which this debate on the book took place) (White 2009: 796).
In their response to the reviewers, Daston and Galison make a case that their
conception of the way the knower relates to the knowledge is orthogonal (italics
mine) to the familiar psychological and sociological ways to understand this. They
interpret psychological as pertaining to the knower as an individual with specific
emotional and intellectual life trajectory, whereas sociological as relating to the
knower as a member of a collective. They theorize their own conception of the fear
as a kind of ‘‘hybrid monster’’ that straddles the boundaries between psychological
and sociological, and psychological and epistemological. They insist that the fear is
genuinely epistemic. It is a ‘‘response to genuine and multiple obstacles to the
acquisition of knowledge’’ (Daston and Galison 2008: 671). The fear is an
‘‘affective state’’ not incompatible with epistemology. They say, ‘‘epistemology is
rooted in an ethos which is at once normative and affective – or affective because
normative’’ (Daston and Galison 2008: 671, italics mine). In short, for Daston and
Galison, the epistemic fear is psychological, collective, and epistemological at the
same time, and hence it is neither pathological nor its occurrence foreground
psychology prior to epistemology as one of the reviewers contends. The key aspect
of Daston and Galison’s insistence is that the fear is ‘‘not irrational,’’ in fact, it is
‘‘reasonable,’’ they argue. This response would indeed keep intact the neo-Kantian
sense of the self. The self that is afraid of itself is so only in the noble pursuit of
objectivity. This self, first and foremost, is normative; it is determined to do the right
thing; it is affective (fearful) only because it is normative. Active self-consciousness
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is thus the ground upon which both the ethics of knowledge and knowledge are
built.
Below, I aim to posit four challenges to Daston and Galison’s central argument
on how epistemology and ethos fuse. I wish to argue that the (epistemic) fear is not
rational but ‘‘irrational’’; it is not ethical but ‘‘pathological.’’ I must point out that
both these terms ‘‘irrational’’ and ‘‘pathological’’ have specific meanings that I will
clarify and discuss later in the essay. The first challenge is derived from Jacques
Lacan’s argument that the subject of science constituted by the mode of modern
science suffers from ‘‘paranoia.’’ The second challenge builds upon Kant’s own
denial that the perfect correspondence between the moral law and the human will is
possible. Kant in fact thought that an ethical human act is impossible without a
‘‘pathological’’ component. The third challenge questions the way Daston and
Galison have taken appearance for being in their application of the Foucauldian
concept of technologies of the self to constructing the scientist-subject of
mechanical objectivity. And the fourth challenge contests the notion of the
unconscious in especially Daston’s earlier and later work.
‘‘Impossibility of Knowing the Real Causes Paranoia’’
For the first challenge, I want to discuss the example that Daston and Galison open
their book with. The British physicist Arthur Worthington is working on the
photographic images taken a few thousandths of a second apart of impact caused by
a liquid drop. He is working on a compendium of hand-drawn sketches of droplet
images since 1875 that eventually contributed to the branch of fluid mechanics. For
Worthington, the splash of milk droplet hitting a hard surface or dropping into a
liquid break into a ‘‘perfect symmetry’’ (Daston and Galison 2007: 11). He ignores
the accidental specificity and peculiarity of what he thinks is a defective splash and
rather sets out to capture the world in its ‘‘types and regularities.’’ The retina
impressions of perfection and symmetry, however, were shattered once he captured
these images for the first time in photographs in 1884. The photographs showed
irregularities instead of symmetries. Not only that the imperfection of nature was
shocking but what Worthington found disturbing was the realization that he was
deceived of idealized, symmetrical mirages for 21 years, he was concerned that
even when he did encounter many irregular and unsymmetrical images, in
compiling these images for the compendium his mind chose only the ‘‘ideal’’ and
symmetrical splashes and rejected irregularities. Worthington concluded that the
selection of idealized images was in fact the error of judgment of a fallible human.
Daston and Galison argue that Worthington was not alone in rejecting the irregular.
The choice of perfect over imperfect was profoundly entrenched in the scientific
practices at that time. With the mechanical camera replacing the mind’s eye in 1895,
the earlier epistemological virtue of documenting perfect and regular images of
nature was reduced to a psychological fault, a defect in perception (Daston and
Galison 2007: 13–16).
Worthington’s realization has an important character. The transition from the
subjective and hence fallible human judgment to the mechanically-produced,
infallible perception meant a major shift in the way nature was visualized. From
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being symmetrical regularity, the physical world now acquired asymmetrical
individuality and as a result became profoundly complex. In Worthington’s
terminology the objective view – the new epistemic virtue – was required to capture
this ‘‘real’’ as opposed to the subjectively-produced ‘‘imaginary’’ nature. Daston and
Galison argue that mechanical objectivity inaugurated new subjectivity that was
required to willfully reject all human intervention, all subjective elements, in the
representation of nature. In projecting this new objectivity-subjectivity, however,
Daston and Galison underplay the shift in the scientist’s attitude towards nature.
Objectivity now meant a ‘‘faithful,’’ ‘‘real,’’ ‘‘exact,’’ ‘‘as it was’’ representation of
nature. The purpose of objectivity, including the mechanical devices like
microscopes and telescopes through which it was ascertained, was to bring the
‘‘remote’’ and ‘‘inaccessible’’ nature closer. The image documented by the previous,
truth-to-nature epistemic objectivity, was idealized, perfected, and it was a
characteristic specimen but not the exact nature. Mechanical objectivity thus made
the perfected nature imperfect and instead aspired to present the object of nature
‘‘just as it was’’ (Daston and Galison 2007: 36, 44–45). In transiting from truth-to-
nature to mechanical objectivity, nature became variable, accidental, impure, and
unknown – but also real and inaccessible (Daston and Galison 2007: 51).
However, expelling everything that was subjective, and capturing the real and
exact nature created anxiety among scientists. It was often expressed that
representing the ‘‘real’’ nature in all its complexity was impossible. For example,
an anatomist, Albrecht van Haller, complained that ‘‘the infinite labor was required
to trace the labyrinthine variety of the arteries, which even numerous dissections
had failed to coalesce into a clear pattern’’ (Daston and Galison 2007: 81). How to
ensure what was represented was indeed a real representation of nature? Would
expelling all subjectivity be enough to ensure it?
What is important to note here is that in selecting the typical and ideal images
while pursuing the epistemic objectivity of truth-to-nature, scientists searched for
the regularity of ‘‘God’s law,’’ the perfection of which can then be admired.
Mechanical objectivity did not provide any such reference point. In fact, in
mechanical objectivity, objectivity and its pursuit remained ‘‘an elusive goal, a
destination always just past the horizon’’ (Daston and Galison 2007: 189). The
impossibility of objectivity was also reflected in the impossibility of expelling all
subjectivity. A naturalist, Rudolf Virchow, declared that even after trying for 30
years he was not able to de-subjectivize him entirely (Daston and Galison 2007:
189). These scientists struggled with ‘‘incoherent scientific objects’’ (Daston and
Galison 2007: 236) and the frustration of falling short of highest epistemic idea of
objectivity was widespread (Daston and Galison 2007: 233). As a result, both
objectivity and the scientific self that practiced it were declared as ‘‘intrinsically
unstable’’ (Daston and Galison 2007: 250). On the account of this impossibility of
ensuring correspondence of their representations to nature as real, ‘‘seeing nature as
it is,’’ scientists became, in Daston and Galison’s own words, ‘‘well-nigh maniacal’’
(Daston and Galison 2007: 66). For the truth-to-nature epistemic virtue, the
reference point of the perfection of God’s law granted the truth of knowledge. But
there is no such reference point available in mechanical objectivity to grant such
Who is the Scientist-Subject? 123
123
certainty of knowledge. How did this shift in the attitude towards nature – the mode
of modern science – constitute the subject?
It was Alexandre Koyre who argued that the birth of modern science is
concomitant with the transformation of philosophical attitude; it marked the reversal
of the value attached to intellectual knowledge in comparison to sensible
experience. Lacan closely followed Koyre’s conviction that it was Descartes who
formulated the principles of new science marking the transformation in philosoph-
ical attitude which was attributed to Cartesian Cogito in the form of the belief in
human rationality. Following Koyre, Lacan said, ‘‘For science, the Cogito marks the
break with every assurance conditioned by intuition’’ (Lacan 1995 [1964]: 261).
Lacan thus dubbed the Cogito endowed with capacity for reasoning as ‘‘subject of
science.’’4 This, Lacan describes as, ‘‘…. a certain moment of the subject that I
consider to be an essential correlate of science….the moment Descartes inaugurates
that goes by the name Cogito’’ (Lacan 1965: 4). Lacan further states, ‘‘…the
modification of our subject position….is inaugural [moment] therein’’ of modern
science, but also that ‘‘science continues to strengthen it [subject position] ever
further’’ (Lacan 1965: 5).
Lacan’s argument about the subject of science has two more contexts. Firstly, he
argues that Descartes’ cogito ergo sum is neither about knowledge nor about
existence but about certainty. Lacan attributes Descartes’ desire for certainty
through the exercise of reason as significantly forming the modern subject.
Secondly, Lacan further argues that this subject of modern science is split between
knowledge and truth. For Descartes, while distinct observations are prerequisite for
the construction of knowledge, it does not grant truth in itself; in other words,
knowledge is not inherently true. Descartes invokes God – a non-deceiving agency
outside of himself – to guarantee the truth of knowledge. The subject then pursues
his own reason in pursuit of knowledge, and God guarantees the truth of this
knowledge. Knowledge and truth are therefore separate, in fact truth is external to
knowledge, and only God joins them together. But God – the benevolent, good
natured God – is an assumption, in fact it is only the faith of the thinking subject
(Lacan 1965: 35, 1977 [1964]).5 It is the subject who imagines God who then grants
4 Dany Nobus attempts to ‘‘reconstruct and clarify Lacan’s argument’’ in the text Science and Truth.
Nobus clarifies that the expression of subject of science in this text is extremely ambiguous. It
simultaneously refers to ‘‘the scientist, the topic of study within scientific practice, science itself, the
subjective elements within science, and the objects subjugated to scientific investigation.’’ I also find
Science and Truth often beyond comprehension. I thereby have closely consulted Nobus’s interpretation
that subject of science juxtaposed with Cogito in the text means human rationality, mental power, and the
certainty of continuous experience of thought (Nobus 2002: 94).
5 Lacan’s Science and Truth, the transcript of the opening seminar on The Object of Psychoanalysis, was
first published in 1965 (Lacan 1965). Many ideas in Science and Truth emerged in Lacan’s previous
seminar on The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis which were subsequently summarized in
the paper Position of the Unconscious. In this trail of thoughts emerging over a year, Lacan was
concerned with the subject of science and the scientificity of psychoanalysis but also about the way
unconscious was structured like language. Many scholars, including those who are expert on Lacan’s
oeuvre have complained that the transcribed and translated text of Science and Truth is fairly
unintelligible and inaccessible. It is crowded with a multiplicity of ideas presented in highly fragmentary
ways. Lacan in general is a difficult philosopher to follow. For example, Jon Mills, one of the prolific
commentators of Lacan’s work, describes his writing as fragmentary, chaotic, incoherent, his jargon
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truth to knowledge. The subject of science, Cogito, therefore is split between
knowledge and truth and it is joined together by the (subjective) faith in God as
symbolic (and not real) guarantee of truth outside of knowledge.
In discussing truth-to-nature epistemic objectivity followed in the 17th and 18th
centuries, Daston and Galison also point out how it was God in whose image the
truth or certainty of knowledge was granted. In the pursuit of perfect, pure, average,
typical and ideal images in nature, the scientist-subject was searching God’s law
that was worthy of admiration (Daston and Galison 2007: 68). The search for the
eternal and non-deceiving agency to grant the truth signified the split between
knowledge and its truth in the sense that truth was always external to knowledge.
Simultaneous pursuit of knowledge and disavowal of its truth thus characterized the
subject of science.
However, in modernity, the reference made to God to guarantee truth has
significantly been altered. In fact, the God as truth-guarantor (in other words, God as
symbolic guarantor), has acquired different names in the secular world. The faith in
God is re-articulated and in turn placed in science itself. This faith is placed not just
in science but in science’s subjects, in the scientific community’s confidence to deal
with complex matters, in mechanical devices, in scientific method such as
empiricism, logic, or mathematics. Alternatively, this faith to guarantee truth is
entrusted to objects of science such as neurons, genes, or forces of nature (Glynos
2002: 65–66). These objects of science in fact acquire the place of demigod, for
instance, the way the gene is made to comprise the immortal essence of humanity in
Richard Dawkins’ work on the selfish gene (Dawkins 2006).
In Science and Truth, however, Lacan makes the point that the simultaneous
pursuit of knowledge and the disavowal of its truth characterizes the subject of
modern science. In making the methods and objects of knowledge to provide
certainty and truth, modern science has progressively reduced truth to knowledge, in
the sense that truth is increasingly located not outside, but inside knowledge. And as
a result, Lacan argues, the modern Cartesian subject split between knowledge and
truth is erased or sutured. One of the main messages of Science and Truth is the way
modern science effectively enables the scientist to forget his subjectivity, it actively
forgets the subjective drama of its practitioners, ‘‘let’s say that [science’s] subject is
not often studied’’ (Lacan 1965: 18). Lacan further argues that the individual
consequences of forgetting subjectivity are manifested in mental anguish, suffering,
even madness. Lacan counts Cantor (quoted at the beginning of the essay) and
Mayer in the list of such ‘‘first-rate tragedies’’ (Lacan 1965: 18).
Footnote 5 continued
highly esoteric which resists articulate systematization (Mills 2003). Most of Lacan’s writings were
originally not written, they were transcribed from lectures and seminars that add an additional layer of
inaccessibility, not to even mention the problems created by the translation from French to English. One
translator and a long time critical scholar of Lacan’s work, Bruce Fink, put it in the preface of his
translation, ‘‘Lacan’s French is….so polyvalent and ambiguous that some frame must be imposed to make
sense of it whatsoever’’ (Miller 1975). Science and Truth has made sense to me in consultation with other
interpretative contributions on ‘‘reconstruction and clarification of Lacan’s argument’’ (Nobus 2002: 89).
I have therefore referred to a few such efforts at ‘‘reconstruction and clarification’’ of Lacan’s arguments
in Science and Truth (Burgoyne 2002; Glynos 2002; Miller 2002; Nobus 2002; Stavrakakis 1999).
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Although Daston and Galison also arrive at the similar conclusion – in their
argument, the demands of objectivity make the scientist-subject to deny his/her
subjectivity, and many such scientists expelling their subjectivity in pursuit of
representing nature as real became ‘‘well-nigh maniacal’’ (Daston and Galison
2007: 66) – there is a significant difference between theirs and Lacan’s argument.
For Daston and Galison, the erasure of subjectivity ensures objectivity, but for
Lacanian psychoanalysis erasing or forgetting subjectivity means paranoia.
For Lacan, not just scientific, all knowledge is paranoiac. And still there is a
significant difference between the paranoia caused by the mode of modern scientific
practice and the foundational aphorism of ‘‘all knowledge being paranoiac’’ in
Lacan’s intellectual oeuvre. Paranoia is derived from Greek: para means outside or
beside oneself and therefore beyond intelligible thought. For Freud, paranoia is ‘‘the
blindness of the seeing eyes not wanting to know’’ (Freud 1893–1895: 117). In other
words, what is paranoid is that stands in opposition, alien to the self. It is not just in
Lacan, but in the entire Freudian tradition of psychoanalysis, knowledge stands in
dialectical relation to fear, the fear of not-knowledge. And, not-knowledge means
negation, conflict or suffering that knowledge can cause. ‘‘My knowledge started off
from paranoiac knowledge,’’ says Lacan (1988 [1954]: 163) In Lacan’s work, the
epistemological context of paranoiac knowledge is situated in three contexts or
orders of being – imaginary, symbolic and real. Firstly, knowledge is paranoiac
developmentally. It begins with the ‘‘mirror stage’’ because it is acquired through
our imaginary relation to the self and the other. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the
‘‘mirror stage’’ that occurs between 6 to 18 months of infancy is the initial point of
self-discovery when the nascent ego or ‘‘I’’ is discovered in the looking glass or
through the eyes of another as metaphorical representation of the mirror. ‘‘The
original specular foundation of the relation to the other…is the first alienation of
desire’’ because it is fundamentally rooted in the imaginary. The ego first recognizes
itself in an object outside of itself in the realm of the imaginary, in the illusory order,
‘‘in a fictional direction,’’ and hence the source of alienation and paranoia (Lacan
1988 [1954]: 176). Secondly, the Lacanian subject discovered in imaginary but lost
in alienation is further recovered through the Other – the symbolic. ‘‘I’’ is never
absolute or autonomous apart from the Other. The Other is ‘‘socially elaborated
situations’’ mediated by linguistic structures, ‘‘I’’ is linked to the ‘‘Other,’’ ‘‘I’’ exists
as the Other (Lacan 1977 [1936]: 5). However, the Other – to repeat, socially
elaborated situations mediated through linguistic structures – especially the Other’s
desire, is a potential threat to the subject, because it is an alien force, and hence the
source of paranoia (Lacan 1988 [1954]: 185). The third order of being, the ‘‘real’’ is
the place of limit, the realm of unconscious, that which is lacking articulation in the
imaginary and symbolic orders. The experience of knowing the real is the most
horrific because it can never be known in itself. Freud compares the realm of the
unconscious with the realm of the nature, ‘‘the unconscious is the true physical
reality, in its innermost nature it is as much unknown to us as the reality of the
external world’’ (Freud 1900: 613). In Lacan’s work, therefore, all knowledge is
paranoiac because the one that emerges from the orders of imaginary and symbolic
is loaded with alienation, opposition, and demand. However, this knowledge is
paranoiac knowledge not because of the fear of the unknown, but because it is
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tainted by the fear of knowing a particular truth of the self and the other, this truth
that the subject may find horrific. But in the domain of the real that the knowledge
becomes impossible, because it acquires indescribable language, this knowledge is
paranoiac because it is beyond mind, unknowable, inaccessible. Because this essay
engages with the world of the real as represented in modern science, I have not
given due space to the paranoiac knowledge of the subject emerging from the
domains of the imaginary and symbolic and have focused more centrally on
paranoia of the subject of science wanting to know the real.
History of objectivity in Daston and Galison’s detailed work shows how in
transiting from practices of truth-to-nature to mechanical objectivity all traces of
God or symbolic guarantee is replaced with real guarantee. The shift from the truth-
to-nature to mechanical objectivity is signified by representing nature not as ideal
and perfect version that the God’s law has created but as nature really is. Modern
science developed increasingly sophisticated experiments and other methods to
capture the reality of the real and to establish certainty of knowledge which almost
always failed to guarantee such certainty and truth, and in this sense the real almost
always remained unknowable. Daston and Galison discuss the way several scientists
accounted for this impossibility of representing the real, some examples of which I
have already mentioned. The other side or perhaps the precondition of this search
for the real is what Lacan said, ‘‘there is no Other of the Other’’ (Lacan 1977 [1964]:
77). In other words, there is no real guarantor behind the symbolic guarantor, first
God and then science – God is only a matter of faith and so is science. It means how
history of science since the time of Descartes has moved in the direction of
foreclosing the symbolic guarantee for the truth of knowledge and replacing it with
the real guarantee. As long as the scientific practice tries to find the real behind the
symbolic, it will end up with ‘‘elaborate’’ and ‘‘grander’’ theories to bridge the gap,
it will end up with proliferation of scientific knowledge and unending displacement
of one scientific object for investigation to another. And in this sense the modern
scientific practice resembles paranoia, not only because the knowledge of the real is
beyond mind, but also because paradoxically this impossibility produces highly
elaborate, rigorously logical, but delusional systems of knowledge (Glynos 2002:
65).
Relating this discussion to Daston and Galison’s Objectivity would mean that the
practice of objectivity emerges from the Cartesian subject’s need for certainty. The
paranoia that this need ultimately generates makes the ‘‘affective,’’ the psycholog-
ical, preceding and driving the epistemological.
‘‘Pathos, not Ethos Drive Epistemology’’
The scientist-self of mechanical objectivity that Daston and Galison portray matches
nothing less than the basic principles of Kantian ethics – the categorical imperative
(the duty qua willful rejection of subjectivity) of the scientist-self is on the same
side as the moral law (ethics of objectivity). In fact, the rational will of the self is the
sole possible authority of the moral law – in other words, there is a complete match
between the will and the moral law. Not only that the will of the scientist, which
includes extreme modification of the self, is something inherently good but the
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moral law (the ethics of objectivity) is also unconditionally good in itself. In
Kantian ethics, the categorical imperative is on the same side of the good (well-
being) of the fellow-men. How ethics of objectivity will ensure the good of the
people is not clear in Objectivity. The same question that is often posed against
Kantian ethics can also be raised here: What if duty and good are on the opposite
sides? What if duty could be accomplished at the detriment of the fellow-men? In
other words, the notion of the good also heralds a pertinent question: Whose good?
Daston and Galison, however, are clear on this point. They think that we must first
know what objectivity is before we decide if it exists or it is good or bad. This is a
fair argument.
To explore this logic further, in Kantian ethics, duty is only that the subject accepts
as her duty, it does not exist in an external list of, say, Ten Commandments. The moral
law is not some entity that prescribes ‘‘do this’’ or ‘‘do that’’ but it is the law that
commands to perform duty without even naming it. In other words, the subject cannot
claim that the duty was imposed upon her, that her action only followed the
commandment of the law. The subject is responsible for her duty; she cannot hide
behind the externally imposed moral law. Otherwise the ethical subject is just an agent
of the moral law, an unnecessary and dispensable element of the moral law. Making
the duty as one’s own is at the core of the relation between the will and the moral law.
To relate this reading to Objectivity, Daston and Galison’s argument of the co-
implication of objectivity-subjectivity perfectly match with Kantian ethics in the sense
that the ethical subject does not bring into a moral situation all subjective and affective
baggage (which then need to be removed or expelled) but the scientist-subject is born
out of the moral situation – born out of the demands of the objectivity, she emerges
from the moral situation of requirements of objectivity, she is made of, she is
constitutive of the law of the objectivity. According to Kant, therefore, the subject acts
contrary to her well-being and pathological interests only for the reasons of the moral
law. In this sense the subject then performs an ethical act, i.e., when she goes against
her well-being and pathologies, she is either angelic or diabolical – neither of which
could be applied to human beings – and hence Kant says that an ethical act that goes
against the well-being and pathologies of the subject is impossible (Zupancic 1998:
59). This impossibility pushes the subject to the manifestation of doubt and guilt and
heralds a further indefinite struggle to separate herself from the pathology.
In the critical scholarship on Kantian ethics, it has been a long standing question if
Kant thought the reason qua will alone as the impetus for moral motivation or did he
think there existed desire, feeling or affect, prior to the will, as source of motivation
to moral law. Is reason independently motivating or it requires a priori ‘‘affect’’ for
the incentive for motivation? Kant himself wonders how it is possible for the ‘‘will
without an object of representation’’ to be the direct incentive for the moral law and
concludes that ‘‘this is an insoluble problem of the human reason’’ (Kant 1993: 75).
There are scholars who insist that Kant put ethical principles as the absolute source of
moral conduct (Nagel 1970: 11, 13), and there are others who think some other
motivational factors beyond reason alone are necessary to account for moral
obligation (Bond 1983: 11). In the chapter Incentives of Pure Practical Reasons in
the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant meditates on ‘‘in what way the moral law
becomes an incentive’’ for the will (Beck 1960: 217). But, here, contrary to his usual
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position on how moral law motivates human will through pure reason, Kant talks
about the effects of the objective moral law on the human subject. This is because the
human constitution is made of both a sensuous nature causing incentives and a
rational nature which gives moral commands. And in the human being the commands
of reason conflicts with the inclination or incentives of sensuous nature. The freedom
to act independently of sensuous inclinations results in pain – this, Kant called
‘‘negative subjective effects.’’ These negative subjective effects are pathological in
nature because derived from our sensuous nature. The negative subjective effects are
not the only source for pathology, though (Beck 1960: 216). Kant also acknowledged
that human actions are governed by another law, the law of the faculty of desire.
‘‘Life is the faculty of a being by which it acts according to the laws of the faculty of
desire. The faculty of desire is the faculty such a being has of causing, through its
representation the reality of the objects of these representation’’ (Kant 1993: 10). The
faculty of desire is represented by a certain object, which could be shame, honor,
fame, approval of others – on the contrary, the faculty of will is not represented by
any such object. And the subject is ‘‘affected’’ by these representations which is the
cause of her action. For Kant, when affection is the cause of action, the actions are
determined pathologically. Kant also talks about the ‘‘positive subjective effect’’ of
the sensuous nature, which he calls ‘‘respect’’ for the moral law, or the moral feeling,
which in German he calls Achtung. Kant attributes the correspondence of the moral
law with the will to the presence of what he calls the ‘‘feeling of respect.’’ The feeling
of respect means that the law is nearby; it indicates the presence of the law; it
provokes the feelings of fear, admiration, wonder and awe – a feeling of sublimation.
Although for Kant, the feeling of respect (for the moral law) ‘‘is a singular feeling,
reason which cannot be compared with any pathological feeling,’’ it is the only drive
of pure practical reason (Kant 1993: 74–75).
This debate over ‘‘pathological’’ component in Kantian ethics continues
depending upon which part of Kant’s vast array of intellectual work is invoked.
For instance, Zupancic contends how Kant did not see that the feeling of respect
could turn into pure and simple, Ehrfurcht, i.e., wonder – something that Kant
himself linked to fear, thus becoming a perfectly pathological motive (Zupancic
1998: 67). Sytsma, on the other hand, discussing the role of Achtung in Kant’s moral
theory, interprets how ‘‘respect’’ is produced solely by reason, and thus respect for
the law is not the incentive to morality but morality itself and hence far from
pathological (Sytsma 1993: 121).
To sum up this discussion, firstly, for Kant a pure ethical act that goes against the
well-being and pathologies of the subject is not possible; secondly, what Kant calls
pathologies are objects of representation such as shame, honor, fame, approval
governed by the faculty of desire; and thirdly, the respect for the moral law is the
only pure drive for practical reason.
In this context, many of Daston’s affect saturated values would qualify as
pathologies in Kantian ethics. In Objectivity, Daston and Galison argue that the
whole purpose of making atlas within the broad scope of truth-to-nature and
mechanical objectivity was to establish standards for the entire disciplinary
community for generations to come (Daston and Galison 2007: 202). Atlases were
one among many scientific values and practices that meant to bind the dispersed
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members together and generate the sense of loyalty among them. ‘‘Internalized and
moralized, these loyalties stamped a distinctly scientific self, which are recognizable
across a diverse range of local contexts,’’ say Daston and Galison (Daston and
Galison 2007: 203). To repeat, in Kantian ethics the feeling of respect, the feeling
for admiration and awe for the moral law, which in Daston would mean demands of
objectivity, is the only pure drive of practical reason. Any other thing, even the
affect of loyalty or desire for approval of others would mean pathology.
As I have already discussed, responding to the reviewers, Daston and Galison
argued that the notion of affective states are the ones in which the psychological and
the epistemological, on the one hand, and the individual and the collective, on the
other, are made to converge. Daston and Galison do not provide any explanation to
the term affective neither do they make any gesture in relating it with the massive
debates on the affective turn in social sciences, body studies, human geography, and
media studies. The meaning of the affective is left to the imagination of the reader –
and in my interpretation, it is broadly understood as the state that is embodied and
deeply emotional but it is not reduced to the purely psychological.
Lorraine Daston in her work has written about what she calls affect saturated values –
a specific constellation of emotions and values, in a well-defined relation to each other,
hanging in balance – upon which science depends for its practices (Daston 1995: 4).
Similar to the arguments inObjectivity, the moral in the moral economy refers at once to
the psychological and to the normative. Daston categorically emphasizes that moral
economy is not a matter of individual psychology; she insists, ‘‘although the moral
economies are about mental states, these are the mental states of collectives’’; ‘‘it is not a
matter of individual psychology’’; ‘‘this is a psychology at the level of whole culture or
subculture’’ (Daston 1995: 4). The examples of affect-saturated and shared values
include devotion to clarity, accuracy, sociability among colleagues, impersonality,
impartiality, moral obligation to discipline, diligence, fastidiousness, thoroughness,
caution, integrity, trust, civility, curiosity, honesty. Paul White comments that as the
model of moral economy of affects saturated values was refined in Daston’s work, the
affects retreated and morals held sway – ‘‘plenty of civility and very little
feelings’’(White 2009: 796). In the background of the discussion on Kantian ethics,
all these collective affect-saturated values making epistemology would qualify as
pathological rather than ethical, because in Kant all morality, by its definition, would
exclude all pathological motives. To remind the readers, this pathology would include
actions caused by the faculty of desire, represented by certain object, for example,
loyalty or fame or shame or approval. Although fame and shame are not listed in
Daston’s affect saturated values, the point I intend to make is that even in Kantian ethics
the pure act of reason, in other words, the moral law perfectly corresponding with the
will is not possible. This would mean that even in Kantian logic the practices of
objectivity are as much pathological as ethical. They are driven by pathos as much as by
ethos.
‘‘Appearance is not Being’’
Daston and Galison clarify that they are after understanding a certain ‘‘prototypical
knower’’ of nature, a type of scientist as a regulative ideal, as opposed to any flesh
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and blood individual (Daston and Galison 2007: 204). They are interested in
delineating the normative force of historically specified exemplary persona (Daston
and Galison 2007: 44). Metaphorically, they prefer ‘‘superficiality of enlargement’’
to ‘‘excavating conjectured depth.’’ Also, their aim is to reveal patterns on how
objectivity and subjectivity – two epistemologies, two ethics, two ways of life –
intertwine so closely (Daston and Galison 2007: 205).
The enlarged view of the normative persona, however, does not necessarily
coincide with the Foucauldian premise on technologies of the self that they adopt to
explain the activation of such persona. In Moral Economy of Science, Daston
postulates that the co-production of feeling and seeing happens in science schools
by the way of apprenticeship – by making the members of the science inculcating
self-discipline and self-surveillance on their own instead of being pushed or
coerced. Daston refers here to Foucault’s technologies of the self and clarifies that
this is an exercise of a microscopic Foucauldian sort of power which structures the
way the scientist comes to know (Daston 1995: 6). Daston and Galison emphasize
the same point in Objectivity and argue that ‘‘technologies of the self – the practices
of mind and body that mold and maintain a particular kind of self’’ (Daston and
Galison 2007: 198–199). These practices include training the senses in scientific
observation. Therefore, keeping lab notebooks and drawing specimens go hand in
hand with monitoring one’s own belief and quieting the will (Daston and Galison
2007: 199). As already mentioned, Daston and Galison clearly declare that they are
interested in the normative force of regulative ideal and not in the flesh and blood
individual. However, in arguing that the normative ideal moulds and shapes the self,
and that it compels the scientist-self to quiet the will and monitor the emotions,
Daston and Galison take appearance for being. They assume that the normative and
regulative ideal is perfectly realized in the scientist self being molded and shaped in
the processes of apprenticeship.
Based on Lacanian psychoanalysis’ challenge to Foucauldian power and
knowledge, I aim to argue below that appearance and being never coincide.
Instead, the discordant relation between the appearance and being is not only the
condition for desire but it explains the existence of conscience. And the place of the
social surface – in terms of Daston and Galison’s enlarged normative view – and the
place of desire or conscience or guilt of the flesh and blood historical subject could
be in contradiction.
Firstly, I aim to argue that under the panoptic gaze of technologies of the self the
scientist-self becomes fully visible, governable, and tractable. In fact, the scientist-
self becomes visible not only to others but to oneself through the specific,
historically constructed norms and standards. However, what is implied in the
argument that the scientist-subject is constructed by the panoptical gaze is that the
subject thus is constructed by one monolithic discourse. The panoptic argument is
ultimately resistant to resistance – in other words, it disallows a subject that can
transcend the regime of power.6 Also, the panoptic argument ignores the fact that
the subject produced by the signifying system can never be determinate. The subject
is indeterminable by its articulation that may result under the influence of a
6 For the further discussion on resistance in Foucault’s notion of power, see Sangren (1995).
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multitude of different discourses (Sangren 1995). Secondly, Joan Copjec in her
Lacanian critique of Foucauldian historicism argues how the scientist-subject is
formed in and by the field of science, but that the subject is never fully formed in
this way. She refers to Bachelard to argue that the scientist-subject is split between
two modes of thoughts, one governed by historically determined scientific norms,
and the other that are eternal, spontaneous and purely mythical (Copjec 1994:
20–21). Copjec further discusses how Bachelard counted the obstacle of imaginary
as the reason for only the partial success for the field of science to form the subject.
Judith Butler elaborates on this point in her meditation on Psychic Life of Power – it
was Louis Althusser who further advanced Bachelard’s theory to show that the
category of imaginary is not an obstacle, on the contrary, it is absolutely necessary
and integral part of the historical process of construction of the subject (Butler 1997:
111–113). Daston and Galison do not account for the role of the imaginary in the
historically determined ideological formation of the subject and therefore their
argument depends upon the assumed verisimilitude between the ideal, the
regulative, the normative and the real referent. Although they have emphatically
declared that their inquiry is focused on the normative scientist-subject formed by
the field of objectivity and not on the actual social individual, the Foucauldian
argument of technologies of the self could be understood only with reference to the
actual social setting, however hypothetical it might be. In fact, in Althusser, the
imaginary, a correction on Bachelard, almost exclusively bears the burden of
ideological construction of the subject. Meaning, the imaginary is constitutive of the
ideological. On the contrary, the categories of imaginary are barely given any space
in Foucault’s, and by their following Daston and Galison’s definition of the
normative laws that govern technologies of the self (Copjec 1994: 20–24). The law
is thus unconditional, it must be obeyed; in fact, being by definition is obedience.
Hence, although the images of self-surveillance and self-correction are required to
construct the subject, if the subject thus constructed is absolutely upright and
correct, fully formed, these categories of self-surveillance and self-correction should
become redundant. The Foucauldian technologies of the self fail to take into
consideration the dialectics between the norm and desire and the element of
indeterminacy that desire introduces in the making of the subject. And therefore, the
enlarged normative view would have made proper sense only if it were juxtaposed
with the deeper excavation of how these norms actually work out in the individual
scientist life.
‘‘The Role of Unconscious in the Making of ‘Science as Habit’’’
In locating the epistemic fear as an affective state, the book Objectivity makes a
connection with Daston’s earlier works on The Moral Economy of Science (Daston
1995) and with her later work On Scientific Observation (Daston 2008). In the latter,
Daston reflects on psychology and proposes to bridge the gap between psychology
and epistemology – clarifying again that psychology in question was collective
rather than individual (Daston 2008: 97). She argues here that learning to see like a
scientist is a matter of accumulated experience, a matter of habit formation of a
well-trained collective. But acquiring this experience is an equation of time – the
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scientist has to go through a gradual process of training before experience turns into
a habit whence for a mature scientist it becomes possible to see things all-at-once –
a naturalist in 1922 described it as a ‘‘jizz,’’ informs Daston. The jizz is an
observation that is sure, swift, silent, and happens without a pause for mental
analysis (Daston 2008: 101). But before the scientist comes to the position to be able
to see things all-at-once, in a jizz, as a matter of habit, she goes through a process of
learning in which perception turns into memory and experience. And, Daston
clarifies, even when this is all about the production of conscious reason, ‘‘the faculty
of epistemology has no inkling as to how it’s done’’ (Daston 2008: 102).
Referring to Ludwik Fleck’s Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact,
Daston further emphasizes the trope of temporality and argues that this knowledge
is not tacit, retroactively it is perfectly possible to describe this process of habit
formation – the way perceptions coalesce into experience – in considerable detail, in
a series of stages and thus bring it to the modes of representation. However, while in
action – while the scientist is seeing things all-at-once, in a jizz – the conscious
reason and faculty of epistemology has no idea how this is done. Daston here refers
to Ludwik Fleck’s interpretation of thought collective and also genesis of the
scientific fact. Fleck describes the process of genesis of the fact – it arises after ‘‘a
signal of resistance in the chaotic initial thinking, then a definite thought constraint,
and finally a form [of the fact] to be directly perceived’’ (Fleck 1981 [1935]: 95).
The genesis/crystallisation of the fact in a thought collective is described in a
musical metaphor – ‘‘the confused notes followed by hummed and inaudible tunes
gradually turning into a melody once the ‘‘co-workers’’ listened and tuned their sets
until these became selective’’ (Fleck 1981 [1935]: 95). The melody could then be
heard even by the unbiased person – meaning, it crystallises into a fact. The genesis
of the scientific fact thus is not only a process in the sense that it is emergent through
time, but most importantly, it involves a ‘‘chain of experiences’’ – first chaos, then
constraint, then perception and then fact emerges. There is similarity between
Daston’s experienced scientist able to see in a jizz, all-at-once, and Fleck’s genesis
of the scientist fact – both are processes, are emergent, subjected to time, and both
constitute a chain of experiences that is although silent and swift in Daston, but can
be retroactively traced into a series of stages in both Daston and Fleck.
However, there are subtle ways in which the irrational and rational, reasonable
and unreasonable, conscious and unconscious, feelings and thought, experience and
fact are intertwined in these accounts. In Objectivity, Daston and Galison refuse to
call ‘‘epistemic fear’’ anything than epistemic, because it could otherwise open the
door for murky realms of the ‘‘irrational’’; the historians of science are very wary of
these – Daston informs us (Daston 2008: 101). Here, the individual subjectivity, a
specific emotional trajectory, the psychology of innermost thoughts, and other
affective intentions of historical actors are relegated to mind reading, and to
biographies of the individual scientist. For Daston, the epistemic fear is structural
and collective and hence ‘‘there is nothing irrational (or reductive) about [it],’’ in
fact, ‘‘it is simultaneously reasonable, psychological and collective’’ (Daston and
Galison 2008: 672). In my reading, it is Daston and Galison’s own fear of
‘‘irrationality’’ that makes them fear the epistemic fear for being anything else than
epistemic.
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But then, even after arguing to make the epistemic fear ‘‘not irrational,’’ Daston
still has to enter in the murky ground in which conscious and unconscious and
thought and feeling are inseparably intertwined – for instance, the jizz happens
without a pose for a mental analysis, here the emergence of the conscious scientific
reason has to go through the path of the unconscious; the way perception turns into
memory into experience into habit has a psychology. And yet again, the conscious
reason, the faculty of epistemology, have no inkling how it is done when it is done
(to repeat, the stages of this process can be retroactively traced, though). This all-at-
once-ness in Daston is explained in the words of Descartes, ‘‘the arguments so
speeded up that it bursts upon the mind as a single cognitive event’’ and ‘‘[n]o
amount of explicit reasoning, even mathematical reasoning, can compete with it’’
(Daston 2008: 110).
In these arguments of Daston the meaning of the psychological finally arrives
home. The jizz, all-at-once-ness, is not about some random eruption of unconscious
upon the conscious. This is about the unconscious fundamentally structuring the
conscious reasoning without the conscious even knowing it. In fact, this is about the
indispensability of the unconscious in ordering the conscious. The claims of all-at-
once-ness, the jizz, the arguments bursting upon the mind as a single cognitive
event, ‘‘they concern,’’ Daston writes, ‘‘largely unconscious processes of percep-
tion’’ happening ‘‘albeit processes that are consciously…. taught and controlled by
the exercise of scientific observation’’ (Daston 2008: 105). And still, instead of
accepting this crucial role of the unconscious in structuring the conscious, Daston’s
tone turns defensive, she insists that even when the perceptual habit – the jizz and
all-at-once-ness – ‘‘is not of reason,’’ or more than reason, ‘‘this does not render
such habits ipso facto irrational’’ (Daston 2008: 105). She repeatedly asserts that,
‘‘[t]here is nothing individual, nothing arbitrary, nothing mystical, [nothing
irrational] about this kind of psychology’’ (Daston 2008: 106). It’s the fear of
epistemic fear lapsing into individual and hence subjective and hence irrational that
drives Daston and Galison to claim that the fear driving epistemology is purely and
only epistemic. I can’t but mention here that Fleck, whom Daston significantly
refers to make her point, however, is upfront in accepting the ‘‘irrationality’’ of
‘‘being experienced.’’ He says, ‘‘[t]he ability directly to perceive…. is acquired only
after much experience….The concept of being experienced, with its hidden
irrationality, acquires fundamental epistemological importance’’ (italics mine)
(Fleck 1981 [1935]: 92). My claim is that Daston’s conceptualization of the terms
like unconscious, psychological, individual and collective are underdetermined
because incorporating their meaning in all richness will threaten the master-self of
Daston and Galison that is made of the Kantian ‘‘ethical imperative’’ at the core. As
already discussed at length, Daston and Galison insist that ‘‘the link between
epistemology and ethics’’ is very strong. Whatever the epistemic virtue, ‘‘the
exhortations are nearly always religious and ascetic in tone. There is always an
ethical imperative at core‘‘ (Daston and Galison 2007: 40).
The role of the unconscious is truncated in Daston’s work in the degree to what is
needed to aid what Fleck calls the ‘‘chain of experiences’’ coalescing into ‘‘the
jizz,’’ and ‘‘the all-at-once-ness.’’ In other words, the unconscious is there only to
silently and swiftly structure the experienced scientist’s epistemic conscious. Daston
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here employs the concept of the unconscious in a selective manner without referring
to its proper origin either in the tradition of Freudian psychoanalysis or even prior to
that tradition. The incorporation of the meaning of the unconscious as it is
understood in the Freudian tradition would seriously jeopardize the self-mastery at
the center of the practices of objectivity in Daston and Galison’s Objectivity. The
Freudian subject is fundamentally split between the conscious and unconscious. In
fact, the unconscious does not come to rescue, aid, or structure the agency of the
conscious, but its repressed drives put serious obstacles in the path of the rational
conscious, and these drives are obstinately resistant to control and even compre-
hension by the conscious. The agency of the unconscious, as it is projected in
Daston, is something akin to ‘‘psychological unconscious’’ and not the genuinely
Freudian unconscious, which, Felicity Callard, discussing such debates in human
geography, argues, constructs an idealized psyche because it is far easier to deal
with it and to make it susceptible to change and transformation, it is an accessible
psyche, conducive to agency, and hence available for political maneuvering. But
this is not the way the psyche necessarily operates if the psychoanalytical concept of
unconscious is genuinely taken into consideration (Callard 2003: 308). And if the
Freudian notion of the unconscious is taken into consideration, the Kantian notion
of self-mastery at the core of objective knowledge production will come under
serious challenge.
Conclusion
The main focus of this essay is to critique the neo-Kantian scientist-self in Lorraine
Daston and Peter Galison’s book Objectivity. While doing so, I have also closely
engaged with Daston’s later and earlier work On Scientific Observation and The
Moral Economy of Science.
The essay challenges Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison’s formulation of the
neo-Kantian self at the core of the scientific-subjectivity. They posit that the
scientist-self is first and foremost normative, it is determined to do the right thing,
i.e., fulfill the ethos of objectivity. In other words, for Daston and Galison the
‘‘categorical imperative’’ (the duty qua willful rejection of subjectivity) of the
scientist-self is on the same side as the moral law (ethics of objectivity). Based on
this conception of the master-self, Daston and Galison argue that the link between
epistemology and ethics is so strong that whatever the epistemic virtue, there is
always ethical imperative at the core. This scientist-self is affective (fearful) only in
the noble pursuit of objectivity. In fact, the fear of subjectivity is the fear that the
core self would become an obstacle in the demands of objectivity and hence this
fear is foremost ethical and normative. Daston and Galison’s scientist-self is thus
made of active self-consciousness upon which both the ethics of knowledge and
knowledge are built.
I have presented four challenges to Daston and Galison’s central argument that
epistemology and ethos fuse. Firstly, following Jacques Lacan’s work, I have argued
that the subject of science constituted by the mode of modern science suffers from
paranoia. It is not the fear of subjectivity interfering with objectivity but the
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impossibility of knowing the truth of the real (of the nature) that causes paranoia.
This paranoia, on the one hand, caused by the erasure of subjectivity triggers much
suffering in the scientist-self, and on the other, creates grander and elaborate
scientific theories that almost always fail to provide the truth or certainty of
knowledge. Here, I have argued that it is not ethos of objectivity that drives
epistemology but pathos of paranoia. The second challenge builds upon Kant’s own
denial that the perfect correspondence between the human will and the moral law is
possible. Kant himself thought that an ethical human act is impossible without the
component of pathology. Thirdly, referring to the contestation of historicism in
Foucault’s work from the location of the existence of desire as the formative part of
subjectivity, I posit that Daston and Galison take appearance for being. Daston and
Galison have argued in Objectivity that they are concerned only with the
prototypical knower, what they call the enlarged view of the normative persona,
and not with the experiences of flesh and blood individuals in real historical and
cultural settings. They, thereby, assume verisimilitude between the ideal, the
regulative, and the normative and the real referent. In brief, the problematic of the
indeterminate and often contradictory relationship between the normative and the
real is pointed out. The fourth challenge questions the notion of psychological and
unconscious in the making of epistemology in Daston’s earlier work on The Moral
Economy of Science and On Scientific Observation, which also make close
connection with Ludwik Fleck’s Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact.
These challenges question, on the one hand, the neo-Kantian conception of the
scientist subject, and, on the other, contest Daston and Galison’s argument that
ethos and not pathos drives the imperative of epistemology.
Based on these challenges to Daston and Galison’s formulation of the co-
construction of psychology/subjectivity and epistemology/objectivity, I wish to
claim, following Michael Polanyi (following Sartre), that existence precedes
essence, or in other words, psychology precedes epistemology. This essay aims to
make a case for the argument that understanding and disclosing ‘‘entities’’ in
scientific domain presupposes an understanding of ‘‘being’’ in general; it also aims
to make a case for an alternative conception of the scientist-subject and
correspondingly an affective and existential conception of science that I have
further explored elsewhere (Shah 2013, 2016).
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